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ON BENDED KNEE (WITH FINGERS CROSSED),
Lee Taft
My heart is in anguish within me,
the terrors of death have fallen
upon me.
Fear and trembling come upon me
and horror overwhelms me.2
INTRODUCTION
These words could have been written by the woman who lost her
husband and all of her children when a detached trailer ran headlong
into her family's car as they returned from a Texas Rangers baseball
game. They could have been written by a single mother whose only
son was left permanently brain impaired when anesthesiologists ad-
ministered the wrong medication during a simple and routine proce-
dure. They are words the children of a young man burned to death
after his gas tank exploded would understand; words that a young boy
might speak if doctors charged with his care had not failed to detect
the metal blade in his neck. They are words that echo across the cen-
turies to describe a human condition all too familiar to modern tort
claimants and the lawyers who represent them.
In the wake of tragedy, the tort lawyer's primary responsibility is to
obtain compensation for the injured party. While the lawyer may of-
fer counsel and solace regarding a client's suffering, his or her explicit
professional task is to locate that suffering within the context of the
lawsuit. In Texas, for example, a claimant's suffering is not an inde-
pendent element in a wrongful death claim, but is, rather, lumped into
the jury's consideration in its award of mental anguish.3 To recover
for mental anguish, the claimant "must show more than mere worry,
1. Copyright Lee Taft © 2005. All rights reserved. Lee Taft, J.D., M.Div., is an ethicist who
provides solutions to businesses, organizations, and individuals facing crisis in the wake of error
by focusing on the ethical opportunities crises offer. Mr. Taft is grateful to Robert Clifford and
Professor Stephan Landsman for organizing the Clifford Symposium, and to Professor Ellen
Pryor for inviting him to participate in the symposium. He would also like to thank Dan
Lombard and the editors of the DePaul Law Review for their editorial direction. Mr. Taft can be
contacted at leetaft@earthlink.net.
2. Psalms 55:4-5 (New Revised Standard Version).
3. For example, in considering the claim of a surviving spouse for wrongful death damages,
the Texas Pattern Jury Charges define mental anguish as "the emotional pain, torment, and
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anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger."'4  Defined, mental
anguish is "a high degree of mental suffering" and must be established
by such "painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment, indigna-
tion, wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation."'5 So,
while injury clearly has nonpecuniary effects, the tort system as pres-
ently constructed is not designed to routinely provide noncash relief
to those who suffer. Anita Bernstein recently observed that "[n]o
constituency presses seriously for apology, therapeutic jurisprudence,
medical monitoring . . . the criminal prosecution of injury-causing
malefactors, or other remedies without cash attached."'6 After all, she
concluded, "money makes tort liability go round."'7
But there is more to the story than Ms. Bernstein reported. There
is, in fact, a growing body of scholarship that addresses the suffering
of litigants in nonpecuniary terms. I refer here to the writings on
apology and its role in the legal environment. The interest in the sub-
ject has been gaining momentum ever since 1986 when the seminal
work of Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rossett was published.8
Since then, scholars have analyzed apology in economic, biological,
psychological, and moral terms and have considered its reparative
benefits, its utility in settling lawsuits, and its ability to keep suits from
being filed at all. 9 Within this body of work, a debate has evolved
about whether an apology should be "protected" from traditional
rules of evidence that would consider a fault-admitting statement an
admission against interest. 10 The debate has extended beyond the
academe into the public sphere. Several states have passed laws pro-
tecting limited expressions of sympathy, and some have enacted stat-
utes that protect apologies even when they include complete
suffering experienced by Mary Payne because of the death of Paul Payne." 1 TEX. PATTERN
JURY CHARGE § 9.2(e) (2003).
4. Star Houston, Inc. v. Shevack, 886 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. App. 1994).
5. Id.
6. Anita Bernstein, The Enterprise of Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 27, 31 (2004).
7. Id.
8. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 461 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999);
Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 460 (2003); Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180
(2000); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135
(2000) [hereinafter Taft, Apology Subverted].
10. For a review of the scholarship, see Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apolo-
gies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2001); Robbennolt, supra note 9; Lee
Taft, Apology Within A Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1010 (2005) [hereinafter Taft, Apology Within).
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admissions of fault." Indeed, as I write, the U.S. Senate is considering
legislation that would protect the apologies of healthcare providers
even when the standard of care was not followed.' 2
I was invited to join this panel considering the impact of the tort
system on the pain and suffering of claimants because I have contrib-
uted to the scholarship on apology. I am a proponent of the full, un-
protected apology.1 3 This is the apology that admits wrongdoing,
accepts responsibility for that wrongful act, and promises future acts
of compensation, including acts of reparation. I believe that when
someone causes harm to another and wishes to apologize for the harm
caused, he or she should offer the apology without being protected
from the consequences that are attached to his or her wrongdoing,
even when those consequences have legal import. From my perspec-
tive, it is the full, unprotected apology that will alleviate suffering-at
least the kind of suffering that is relieved by reparative, spiritual
processes like forgiveness. If I were suffering as the psalmist de-
scribes, and my suffering was due to harm inflicted by another, only
the full, unprotected apology would alleviate the spiritual dimension
of my angst.
Mine is a moral perspective from which I view the telos of apology
as one of reparation. Not everyone shares this viewpoint, a fact I was
reminded of a few years ago during a panel discussion at Southern
Methodist University's Dedman School of Law. Justice Albie Sachs, a
justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former free-
dom fighter, was in the audience. Addressing the issue of the pro-
tected apology, he opined that he would rather have his enemy "on
bended knee" than not at all. The experience of witnessing his en-
emy's humiliation was what he wanted, what he suggested would alle-
viate his suffering. But what if while on bended knee Justice Sachs's
enemy's fingers were crossed? Could what appeared to be a bended
knee be a Trojan horse instead?
In this essay I will explore that question in the context of tort litiga-
tion. I will show how apology has been misidentified and its qualities
overstated, and how in my own writing I have contributed to that con-
fusion. In this discussion it will become clear that apology has limits,
and that there is danger in overlooking its parameters. My thesis is
11. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-135 (West 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 23D (West 2000); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004).
12. The National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th Cong.
(2005).
13. For the full text of my arguments, see Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9; Taft, Apology
Within, supra note 10; Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake].
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that if we fail to understand the limits of apology, what it is and what
it is not, we risk contributing to a tort claimant's suffering, potentially
compounding suffering rather than reducing it. This is what can hap-
pen when we mistake apology for, or conflate it with, related repara-
tive processes, assign attributions to apology that it does not have, or
fail to understand its role in the dialectical process of reconciliation.
II. APOLOGY DEFINED
To understand the role of apology in alleviating a tort claimant's
suffering, we must first consider what is meant by apology. In 2005,
Harvard President Lawrence Summers suggested that innate differ-
ences might make women less capable than men in science and math
careers. 14 When confronted by the outrageousness of this claim, he
published a letter to Harvard's standing committee on women, in
which he wrote: "I apologize for any adverse impact the comments
might have had." 15 If you were one of the women on that committee,
would you define this response as an apology? Would these words
help you heal? When Prince Harry attended a costume party wearing
a Nazi uniform and swastika armband, he issued a statement in which
he said "it was a poor choice of costume and I apologize."'1 6 Is this
expression what we intend when we talk about apology?
Nicholas Tavuchis, a sociologist whose detailed work on apology
and its cultural implications is frequently cited by scholars, held that
there are two essential ingredients for an apology: "The offender has
to be sorry and has to say S0."117 In his popular new book, On Apol-
ogy, psychiatrist Aaron Lazare expanded this definition. Lazare de-
fined apology as "an encounter between two parties in which one
party, the offender, acknowledges responsibility for an offense or
grievance and expresses regret or remorse to a second party, the ag-
grieved."'1 8 According to Lazare, this apologetic encounter has four
distinct movements: (1) acknowledging the offense, (2) communicat-
ing remorse, (3) offering explanations, and (4) making reparations.' 9
Yet, in extrapolating the expression of remorse for harm caused to the
14. Harvard Chief Backs Off Remark Seen As Sexist, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 20, 2005, at A4,
available at 2005 WLNR 870508 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id.
16. Harry Learns History the Hard Way, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Jan. 21, 2005, at
A13, available at 2005 WLNR 889626.
17. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA 36 (1991).
18. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 23 (2004).
19. Id. at 107. Legal scholars recognize similar elements. See, e.g., O'Hara & Yarn, supra note
9, at 1133-36.
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activities that correct it, Lazare broadened the definition of apology so
that it closely approximates the religious concept of repentance.
He is not unaware of this. As he observed, "The discussions in re-
ligion that refer to apology are most often found under the topic of
'repentance,' a subject closely related to and often used synonymously
with apology. ' 20 This is an important observation because it helps us
see why it is that the meaning of apology-in our culture generally
and in legal scholarship particularly-has become confused. I think
that confusion is tied to the unwillingness of secular, intellectual cul-
ture to borrow religious language, even when that language is more
accurate. Using religious language is risky business in any academic
setting outside of a divinity school. After all, many in the academe
find "the term 'religious nut' a redundancy. '21
Lazare is not alone in conflating apology with the related but dis-
tinct concept of religious repentance. I, too, have contributed to the
confusion between these terms. In an earlier essay on apology and its
role in mediation, I described it as "the centerpiece in a moral dialec-
tic between sorrow and forgiveness. '22 More recently, I described
apology "as the voice of repentance. '23 But I fear that I still have
failed to clearly articulate the material distinction between apology
and repentance, a distinction that is relevant to the role of apology in
the alleviation of a tort claimant's suffering.
It is true that apology falls between harm and forgiveness, but it is
not apology that is the centerpiece in that dialectic as I originally
thought. I see now that repentance is the real link between harm and
reconciliation. As the voice of repentance, apology plays an impor-
tant role, but does not in and of itself complete the task of repentance.
While apology gives repentance voice, it does not do something as
does the performance of repentance. This calls into question a second
observation I made in that first essay, and that was my agreement with
J.L. Austin that apology is a performative utterance. 24
Austin presented his now famous argument as a William James lec-
ture at Harvard in 1955. His argument challenged the philosophical
assumption "that to say something" is "simply to state something. ' 25
Austin distinguished between constative utterances and performative
20. LAZARE, supra note 18, at 229.
21. Randall Sullivan, Between Doubt and Faith, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 27, 2005, at
P1, available at http://www.dallasnews.com.
22. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9, at 1143.
23. Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 13, at 66.
24. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9, at 1139 & n.15.
25. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 12 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds.,
1975).
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utterances. A constative utterance can be objectively judged true or
false, like "the cat is on the mat .... ",26 In contrast, there are times
when "to say something is to do something, or in saying something we
do something, and even by saying something we do something." 27
Perhaps the best example of a performative utterance is the statement
"I do" by the bride or groom in a marriage ceremony. Austin consid-
ered "I apologize" as paradigmatic of a performative utterance and I
agreed with him.2 8
Whether apology is a performative utterance was not material to
the central argument I made in that essay. There I argued in favor of
the moral dimension of apology and against its subversion through
strategic and instrumental tactics. 29 But defining apology as a
performative utterance contributes to the modern cultural trend that
conflates apology with repentance because it suggests that apology in-
vites forgiveness as effectively as "I do" cements a marriage. As the
voice of repentance, apology expresses remorse, one of the four ele-
ments of repentance, and it may include a promise to repent. But
apology does not do the work of repentance. There is a distinction
between "I do" in a marriage ceremony and "I apologize" when spo-
ken in the wake of serious injury, and that distinction makes a differ-
ence when we consider apology and its role in alleviating a tort
victim's suffering. When I say "I am sorry" I may be sincerely com-
municating remorse, but that alone, uncoupled from the remaining el-
ements of repentance, does not really address the harm inflicted. If
you have caused me to fall into a well, what does an expression of
remorse really do to alleviate my suffering? What will alleviate my
suffering is your providing a ladder and a light.30
The reason I offer this clarification is because "I am sorry" has at-
tained new value in our culture generally, as well as in the legal arena.
In the language of popular culture, there has been a "dumbing down"
of repentance, so that in the wake of error we accept "I am sorry"
with no expectation of further acts of reparation. We see this in politi-
cal contexts routinely-think Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, or
Donald Rumsfeld and George Bush and the Iraqi prison scandal. We
also see it in the legal arena, exemplified in the statutory movement to
26. Id. at 146.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9, at 1139 & n.15.
29. See generally id.
30. This example highlights a theological tension between those who accept the idea of a God
who suffers with us and those who reject "the notion of a suffering God who is powerless."
ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, SHE WHO Is: THE MYSTERY OF GOD IN FEMINIST THEOLOGICAL Dis-
COURSE 267 (1996).
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protect apologies. I do not want to contribute to this moral backslide
and so it is important to clarify the difference between "I am sorry"
and "I repent."
III. REPENTANCE
The religious concept of repentance "unites two linguistic and theo-
logical traditions" by combining the Greek metanoia with the Hebrew
shuv.31 Metanoia suggests a fundamental change of mind in the same
way metamorphosis suggests a fundamental change in form.32 Shuv is
a Hebrew root word meaning "to turn" or "to return," as in turning
away from wrong conduct and returning to right pathways. ' 33 The
elements of repentance are remorse, apology, restitution, and a re-
structuring of life. Repentance is the centerpiece in the dialectic be-
tween harm, forgiveness, and reconciliation, a process illustrated
below: 34
Reconciliation Diagram
EVENT
4 A ......
RECONCILIATION REPENTANOE
...............................
FORGIVENE$S
Apology, then, is an integral part of repentance-apology is the
voice of repentance. Yet, in the wake of serious injury, apology is
31. Malcolm David Eckel, A Buddhist Approach to Repentance, in REPENTANCE: A COMPAR-
ATIVE PERSPECTIVE 129 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carny eds., 1997) (citing THEOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 978 (Gerhard Kittel ed., 1967)).
32. Id. See also THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, supra note 31, at 978,
984.
33. THE BROWN-DRIVER-BRIGGS HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON 996 (Francis Brown et al.
eds., 1996); NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY & EXEGE-
SiS 55 (Willem A. VanGemeren ed., 1997); THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTA-
MENT, supra note 31, at 984. The Biblical story of the Prodigal Son is paradigmatic of the
Christian view of repentance.
34. See Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 13, at 65.
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often launched with an expectation that it will in and of itself invite
forgiveness. 35 From my perspective, much more than a statement of
"I am sorry" should be required before one grants forgiveness. I am
not prepared to say that forgiveness in the absence of repentance is
morally wrong, although I believe forgiveness granted unilaterally or
too quickly can complicate a claimant's suffering by encouraging a
claimant to relinquish valuable legal rights. At the same time, I do not
think I have the capacity to forgive as generously or as quickly as did a
speaker I heard several years ago at a legal conference on forgiveness.
The speaker, an expert on forgiveness, told of his mother's brutal
murder and how he began a process of forgiveness of her murderers
within twenty-four hours of her death.36 His testimony is evidence
that forgiveness is possible regardless of repentance, even in the most
heinous of circumstances. Still, I wondered what his mother would
say of such forgiveness. If I were she, I think I would want my son to
hold on to a sense of outrage at least for some extended period of
time. I would also want him to remember the limits of his forgiveness.
In Dostoevsky's The Grand Inquisitor, Ivan tells the story of a
young serf boy who injured the landowner's dog.37 As punishment,
the boy was stripped naked and forced to run. The dogs were released
and the child was mauled, shredded limb from limb. In examining the
boundaries of forgiveness, Ivan concludes that the mother, if she
chooses, can forgive the loss she herself suffered, but "she has no right
to forgive the suffering of her child who was torn to pieces ....
How we think about apology and repentance in relation to forgive-
ness matters in the context of the alleviation of suffering. We need to
be self-conscious about what we, and our clients, demand in exchange
for forgiveness. Lazare believes that forgiveness "is a process by
which the offended party or victim relinquishes grudges, feelings of
hatred, bitterness, animosity, or resentment toward the offender. In
addition, the person who forgives forgoes wishes and plans for retalia-
tion, revenge, and claims for restitution.'3 9 I see things differently. I
do not believe forgiveness demands that an injured party relinquish a
claim for compensation. I believe that I can forgive and still maintain
35. See discussion, infra notes 40-45.
36. The speaker was noted forgiveness expert Everett L. Worthington, Jr. who made remarks
at a symposium presented by the Fordham Urban Law Journal and The Louis Stein Center for
Law and Ethics on January 28, 2000.
37. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 243-45 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., Rich-
ard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 1990) (1880).
38. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9, at 1155-56 n.99 (citing and quoting DOsToEvsKY,
supra note 37, at 243-45).
39. LAZARE, supra note 18, at 230-31 (emphasis added).
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a claim for restitution. That is, I do not see forgiveness and justice
disjunctively, but rather in the framework of "both-and." For me, jus-
tice and forgiveness are interdependent. It is not my intention in this
essay to argue the merits of either view, but rather to show that how
one views forgiveness matters, particularly in a discussion about alle-
viating suffering for a tort claimant.
The above discussion makes clear that forgiveness work is, as Jeffrie
Murphy noted, "risky business. ' 40 This is particularly true when
moral processes are transcribed into an adversarial system. Over the
past several years, there have been a variety of studies demonstrating
that many claimants do not pursue tort remedies if they have received
an apology.4' After apology many "meritorious claims tend to drop
out of the pool."'42 Results like these have been applauded and fur-
nish the fuel for further research on the specific kinds of apologies
that are most efficacious in influencing claimants to forgo litigation. 43
The efficacy of apology is so expected that researchers assume that a
victim who forgives his transgressor "will accept less than full compen-
sation for his injury. '44 Indeed, scholars seem surprised when they
observe that "[v]ictims sometimes demand at least partial compensa-
tion even when they accept apologies. 45
The idea that apology, not repentance, is traded for a meritorious
claim raises a concern for me. I worry that claimants are being duped
by communication strategies into relinquishing valuable legal rights,
which can actually exacerbate the economic dimension of suffering.
But it is not my intention to engage in a polemic against strategic or
protected apology. I have already said much on that topic. 46 Instead,
I want to consider the implications the data suggest for those whose
goal it is to see their enemy on bended knee.
40. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 115 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malprac-
tice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do
People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609
(June, 1994). See also O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 9, at 1124. Of course, the data may be depen-
dent on who is doing the reporting. See Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 13, at 82
n.182.
42. Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors
Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1079 (2004).
43. This study is presently being conducted at Johns Hopkins, according to Dr. Albert Wu
who is leading this study. Communication on file with author.
44. See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 9, at 1178.
45. Id. at 1175.
46. See, e.g., Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 9; Taft, Apology Within, supra note 10.
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IV. HUMILIATION
In his examination of the psychology of tort compensation, Daniel
Shuman reminded us that "[m]odern tort law is rooted in the legal
system's search for an alternative to the blood feud."'47 He noted the
power of these origins and underscored "a primal need of injured per-
sons to seek vindication for their injury beyond mere compensation
for the monetary value of their loss."48i Murphy saw value in vindic-
tive passions because, as the above data regarding relinquished claims
suggests, in hasty forgiveness we risk relinquishing valuable legal
rights. 49 He noted, too, that vindictive emotions cut against a "mor-
ally flabby worldview wherein wrongdoing is not taken seriously and
in which wrongdoers are given insufficient incentives to repent, atone,
and repair."'50
In my work on apology, I have not focused on the role of apology
within a ritual of humiliation. My focus has been on apology within
the process that leads from harm inflicted through repentance inviting
forgiveness and reconciliation. This is why I was interested when Jus-
tice Sachs presented the view that what mattered was that apology
brought his enemy to bended knee. Our views of the teleologies of
apology and repentance seemed to be at odds. Yet, in reflection, I see
there is resonance between my view of apology within a ritual of repa-
ration and those who see apology as a ritual of humiliation. That
resonance is our shared view that there must be some marker of au-
thenticity of the sincerity of apology, whether the ritual is seen as one
of humiliation or one of reparation.
In his recent book, Faking It, William Ian Miller devoted a chapter
to apology and concluded that apology is always suspect because re-
morse is such an easy emotion to fake. 51 To get around "apology's
easy fakeability," Miller suggested that we either "hone our detection
radar to unmask the false heart" or make "sure the apology hurts the
person giving it. ' '52 Miller settled on the latter.
He described a ritual from the thirteenth century to show how
bloodfeuding cultures resolved the issue of false remorse. Miller's
description begins with X and Y playing a game in which poles were
used to goad horses into fighting each other. In the course of the
47. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39,
40 (1994).
48. Id.
49. MURPHY, supra note 40, at 115.
50. Id.
51. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 77-78 (2003).
52. Id. at 83.
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game, X accidentally hits Y with a pole. X calls time out and says, "I
am sorry, I did not mean to hit you." 5 3 Then X adds what Miller de-
scribed as "the crucial addendum": "I will pay you sixty sheep so that
you will not blame me and will understand that I did not mean it."'4
The stakes would have been higher had X intended to hit y.55 Ac-
cording to Miller, in bloodfeud cultures, intentional misconduct would
trigger "elaborate ceremonies of reconciliation and peacemaking, usu-
ally after, not before, a few people lost their lives."' 56 These ceremo-
nies might conclude with X having to lay his head on Y's knee and
plead with Y to give it back. 57 In these cultures there was an insepara-
ble link among apology, humiliation, compensation, and forgiveness.
And, from Miller's perspective, considering how easy it is to fake
apologies, this is exactly as it should be.
Miller insisted, then, on some punitive element attached to the
apology, something that causes pain to the party offering it. This is
tied to his original premise that remorse is easily faked, so there must
be some measure of sincerity, even if what is measured is the pain in
having to turn over sixty sheep. Miller insisted that apology contain
an element of satisfaction, a term St. Thomas Aquinas described as
"compensation for injury inflicted." 58 Miller argued that even when
apology is insincere there is still this element of satisfaction: "Q: What
is the substance of satisfaction to the wronged person in an unfelt
apology? A: The pain it costs the apologizer to give it.''59
This is where Miller and my views converge, even though he saw
apology within the context of a ritual of humiliation and I see it as an
integral element in a process of reparation. We both seek indices of
authenticity within a process we see as easily subjected to subversion.
Miller's satisfaction, his sixty sheep, is my demand that one who offers
an apology accept the consequences that flow from it. So even though
we see the telos of the ritual differently, we both demand evidence of
authenticity. Miller's focus on humiliation is especially helpful when
we turn back to Justice Sachs and his desire to see his enemy on
bended knee.
Through Miller's lens, Sachs's desire to witness his enemy's humilia-
tion-to see his enemy on bended knee-was the satisfaction that
53. Id. at 85.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. MILLER, supra note 51, at 85.
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id. at 88.
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Sachs sought. After all, "shaming sanctions, like apology, often satisfy
... 'retributive' thirst by communicating.., normative, as opposed to
legal, standards. ' 60 Men may be particularly susceptible to the desire
to satisfy this thirst for retribution through rituals of humiliation, be-
cause "[m]en are attuned to the symbolic power of apology, especially
as a signal of weakness or an advertisement of defeat."'61 And, ac-
cording to Sachs, his thirst would be quenched by seeing his enemy on
bended knee. But what about the sixty sheep? What if the rule was
that only Sachs could see his enemy on bended knee and could not
report to others what he had seen? Would contrition so limited still
provide him satisfaction?
These are the questions I pondered later, the kinds of questions fa-
miliar to every trial lawyer; the ones that occur while the jury is out or
immediately after the witness is finally passed, a lawyer's esprit de
1'escalier. I think Sachs was saying that the act of humiliation was in
and of itself the satisfaction he desired, the bended knee was the sixty
sheep. Sincerity was immaterial when humiliation was the goal. Sachs
was a latecomer to the discussion that night in Dallas, and I do not
know whether he had read my essay. I cannot imagine that Sachs, a
hero in the South African fight for freedom, would find satisfaction in
secret contrition. For Sachs, it seems the satisfaction would be tied to
the public humiliation his enemy suffered and the political advantages
that this humiliation created for those whose freedom Sachs had dedi-
cated his life.
It is important to recall the roots of the modern tort system, espe-
cially its attempt to mollify the human inclination toward vengeance.
Tort claimants are people whose lives have been turned upside down,
people upon whom "the terrors of death have fallen," people over-
whelmed by horror.62 It is important to remember that there are
dimensions to a tort victim's suffering that make it different from the
suffering each of us endures as a part of human experience-ordinary
suffering that is interwoven in earth-side living. The parent who loses
his or her child because another fails to obey a traffic signal suffers
differently from the parent whose child dies from illness. Both grieve,
but the grief of the tort' claimant is compounded with powerful and
complex emotions because of the relationship of their loss to an-
other's wrongful act.
60. Latif, supra note 10, at 313 (referencing Professor David Karp's argument).
61. Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First
Century, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 829, 852 (2003).
62. See Psalms, supra note 2.
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There may be tort claimants for whom, like Sachs, humiliation is the
object of his or her satisfaction, and the sole reason they pursue litiga-
tion. After all, a desire for vengeance is a legitimate and moral emo-
tion. Some have suggested that there is even a biological component
to it, that "[t]he 'urge to avenge wrong'. . . 'may indeed be hardwired
into the human psyche' .... "63 Vengeance recognizes the existence of
injustice and insists on its correction. From this view, a desire for ven-
geance expresses a particular notion of the nature of justice itself.64
Yet, in my twenty years as a tort specialist, I never had a client who
wanted only to see his or her enemy on bended knee. Each also
wanted his or her sixty sheep.
As an alternative to the blood feud, modern tort law is only an ex-
periment-what Shuman called a "civilizing effort. '65 Yet, within this
elaborate system of compensation, rituals of humiliation, repentance,
and reconciliation have all but disappeared. When cases are settled,
we have no rituals where the sixty sheep given in satisfaction for harm
caused are formally exchanged, no elaborate displays where we lay
our heads on our adversary's knee, begging that it be returned at-
tached. Somewhere in our evolution away from the blood feud, we
lost something of value: rituals that addressed competing human
desires-the inclination to seek vengeance and the desire for peace. I
think we recognize something has been lost in this civilizing effort,
and that recognition is what has sparked, or at least contributed to,
the recent attention in legal scholarship to apology and its role in
litigation.
Yet, even with that recognition, the primary focus on apology cen-
ters on its efficacy. We are more concerned with its capacity to settle
lawsuits than we are with its moral dimension and the role it plays in
reparative processes and rituals. It is almost as if apology has been
reduced to an instrument of tort reform.
If we believe that tort compensation is an appropriate form of jus-
tice, then we should find offense when those unjustly injured are in
turn unjustly compensated. It should be cause for alarm when victims
are revictimized with partial reparative movements that lead them to
relinquish meritorious claims. In promoting the utility of apology, the
economic suffering it has the capacity to inflict is often overlooked.
Seeing our enemy on bended knee may alleviate suffering tied to the
human inclination for revenge, but when it leads someone who has
63. James Q. Whitman, Between Self-Defense and Vengeance/Between Social Contract and
Monopoly of Violence, 39 TULSA L. REV. 901, 906 (2004).
64. Id.
65. See Shuman, supra note 47, at 40.
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suffered serious injury to relinquish a meritorious claim, it can indeed
become a Trojan horse.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not simply a matter of semantics when we say apology and
mean repentance. In conflating these concepts, we overstate the sig-
nificance of apology and assign attributes to it that it does not possess.
In tort litigation, this conflation, as the data reveals, has the capacity
to contribute to a claimant's suffering. This is especially true for
claimants who forgive quickly and who, like Lazare, believe forgive-
ness includes relinquishing valuable legal rights. To correct this, apol-
ogy should be used only when we intend to describe a communication
of regret or remorse, thus linguistically recognizing its limitations and
disconnecting it from attributes it does not possess. If we intend to
describe the process that invites forgiveness and reconciliation, we
should use the word repentance and thus disrupt the conflation that
has occurred between a reparative process and one of its essential
elements.
With our terms defined, we should be bold in thinking about repen-
tance and the innovative role it can play in litigation. I work with
organizations, businesses, and individuals facing crisis in the wake of
error, guiding and creating litigation strategies framed by a client's
willingness to authentically repent. Those who have the courage to
follow this path have been pleased to see that ethics and efficacy can
converge. While innovative, my approach is not original. For exam-
ple, the Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, tells
patients whenever there has been a problem with their care, conducts
face-to-face meetings where apologies can occur, and makes offers of
compensation and reparation. 66 Before they introduced this policy,
the "Lexington VA was among the nation's VA hospitals that paid the
most in claims," 67 and now they are among the government's hospitals
that pay out the least.68
Martha Minow noted that in the wake of catastrophic loss "Legal
responses are inevitably frail and insufficient. ' 69 This is a good re-
minder that when it comes to contemplating major loss no compensa-
tion and no act of reparation will adequately address the victim's loss.
Still, in spite of its limitation, the tort system is the legal vehicle we
have designed to address the suffering of those upon whom "the ter-
66. See Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake, supra note 13, at 83-85.
67. Id. at 84 (citing Owning Up to Ethics Saves Money, 30 NURSING 53, 53 (2000)).
68. Id. (citing Owning Up to Ethics Saves Money, supra note 67).
69. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 5 (1998).
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rors of death have fallen." 70 Of course, the concept of suffering is a
complex topic, interdisciplinary in its experience, with medical, philo-
sophical, psychological, and religious associations-processes "inextri-
cably intertwined with each other. ' 71 Suffering is an experience that
is exacerbated when it lacks meaning to the one suffering, and so mak-
ing meaning of suffering is a critical component in healing for the one
harmed. 72
Authentic repentance alleviates suffering because it adds this criti-
cal dimension of meaning to one who suffers. In its authentic expres-
sion, it acknowledges that a wrong has occurred and that it was not
the claimant's fault. Repentance also offers compensation-Miller's
sixty sheep. And, importantly, the final element of authentic repen-
tance, restructuring, communicates that the party who committed the
wrong has learned from the mistake and has effected a change in be-
havior or practice so that others will not be similarly harmed. Restruc-
turing was the nonmonetary element that was of critical importance to
my clients because, to the extent it served as a catalyst for change, it
injected meaning into what might otherwise have been senseless trag-
edy. Knowing that others will not be similarly harmed matters.
This is why it is important that we continue to explore ways to en-
courage authentic rituals and acts of reparation within the tort system.
They alleviate suffering. This fact alone makes it worth every effort
we take to explore, examine, and address the role of repentance in the
tort system. Yet, efforts to encourage repentance will also contribute
to systemic changes so that future, similar harm is avoided. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, authentic repentance disrupts the
moral backslide we now witness in our culture where we offer expres-
sions of remorse while simultaneously distancing ourselves from ac-
countability for harms we cause and the consequences tied to them.
70. See Psalms, supra note 2.
71. ERICH H. LoEwy, SUFFERING AND THE BENEFICENT COMMUNITY: BEYOND LIBERTARI-
ANISM 13 (1991).
72. Id. at 3.
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